Appropriation art has often been thought to support the view that authorship in art is an outmoded or misguided notion. Through a thought experiment comparing appropriation art to a unique case of artistic forgery, I examine and reject a number of candidates for the distinction that makes artists the authors of their work while forgers are not. The crucial difference is seen to lie in the fact that artists bear ultimate responsibility for whatever objectives they choose to pursue through their work, whereas the forger's central objectives are determined by the nature of the activity of forgery.
I. Introduction
What it is that makes an artist the author of an artwork? What does the special relation of authorship, such that the work should be interpreted in 2 terms of the artist's meanings (or at least in terms of meanings the artist could have had) consist in? Famously, the notion of the author came into question in the 20 th century with thinkers like Roland Barthes, who closes his obituary of the author with the suggestion that 'the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.' 1 Michel Foucault agrees, arguing that the concept of the author is a tyrannical one that does little more than restrict the free thinking of readers.
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The 1960s saw the genesis of an artistic trend that seemed to give substance to the theories of Foucault and Barthes. The appropriation artists, beginning with Elaine Sturtevant, simply created copies of works by other artists, with little or no manipulation or alteration, and presented these copies as their own works. The work of the appropriation artists, which continues into the present, might well be thought to support the idea that the author is dead: in taking freely from the works of other artists, they seem to ask, with Foucault, 'What difference does it make who is speaking?' 3 But if we think more carefully about their works, it becomes clear that this impression is misleading: even, and sometimes especially, in the case of the appropriation artists, it does matter who is speaking.
I will begin by providing a brief overview of practices in appropriation art to provide some historical grounding. I will then construct a thought experiment comparing appropriation art to a highly unusual case of artistic forgery. Consideration of several possible candidates for the relevant difference between appropriation artist and forger, the difference that makes artists authors of their work while forgers are not, will shed light on the nature of authorship in contemporary art, and in art more generally. We will find that, contrary to what has often been thought, the work of the appropriation artists affirms and exposes, rather than undermining, the artist's ultimate authorial status.
II. Appropriation Art
In art of the last several decades, practices of radical appropriation from other artworks are common. Elaine Sturtevant, often considered the earliest practitioner, began in the 1960s to reproduce, 'as exactly as possible', 4 the works of her contemporaries, including Roy Lichtenstein, Claes Oldenburg, Jasper Johns, Frank Stella and Andy Warhol. 5 She aimed to use the same techniques they used, and in some cases enlisted their aid: on at least one occasion, Warhol lent his screens for her copies of his silkscreen works. 6 Sturtevant has said that in the 1960s, she usually allowed in one 'mistake' which distinguished her product from the original work. 7 But in general, the results were very close to the originals.
Of course, appropriation in art is nothing new. Borrowing from the work of other artists has been a time-honoured practice throughout much of art history: painters, for instance, have often repainted the works of others in order to explore the application of their own style to a familiar composition and subject matter. Sturtevant, however, took appropriation to a new extreme. Simply to paint a precise copy of another artist's work and claim it as one's own artwork, while openly acknowledging that it is a copy, poses a certain kind of challenge to the concept of authorship that had never the tenuous appearance of their authorship status, the appropriation artists are, in fact, authors in the full sense of the word. The reasons for this will shed light on authorship in non-appropriation art as well.
IV. Appropriation vs. Forgery: A Thought Experiment
I propose a thought experiment that invites us to compare the case of the appropriation artist, who has a genuine (if minimal) authorship relation to her work, and a case of artistic forgery, where that authorship relation is absent. The thought experiment involves a very special kind of forgery, one case, let us suppose that the forger has at least one spectacular success: she manages to produce an artwork that looks the same as the victim's next work, and appears to express the same ideas in the same way. But the forger's work was produced prior to the victim's. We will assume, further, that the forger somehow manages to pass her product off as a work by the original artist. Perhaps she has a shady intermediary who trades the work in an art market where procedures for checking provenance are a bit lax.
Perhaps it never occurs to anyone in the transaction that someone would have enough chutzpah to blatantly rip off the work of a living artist in this way. In any case, the work is successfully passed off as that of the victim.
And this is not surprising, since the work really is an excellent replica, or more accurately 'preplica', of the victim's work, with very similar visible properties and employing identical materials. The two works are visually more or less indistinguishable, providing the viewer with no reason to choose one as the work of the original artist and regard the other as inauthentic.
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The question we now must ask, given the similarity of the forger's and the artist's products, is, What is the relevant difference between them, the difference that makes for the artist's being an author of her work and the forger's failing to be an author? On one way of looking at things, the forger and the original artist have done almost exactly the same thing: they have produced the same work at roughly the same time and under similar historical and cultural conditions. In this way, the case differs markedly from classic cases described in the philosophical literature on forgery. In these classic cases, the forger is usually working from a position of technical advantage, often due to the elapsing of decades or centuries between the original artist's production and the forger's copies or pastiches. The artist's achievement is thus typically taken to be greater than the forger's, since the forger has taken advantage of artistic developments that weren't available during the period when the original artist was working. 12 For example, Han van Meegeren, who was for some time a highly successful forger of Vermeer, was the beneficiary of centuries of study of Vermeer's paint application, use of light, and so forth. 13 Thus the forger's work may look good in comparison to works of the period forged, but only because the forger has cheated.
But in the special case of forgery we are now considering, the situation is quite different. The forger doesn't have any extra tools under her belt;
she has access only to the same artistic developments that the victim has access to. Indeed, if there is a difference in what the forger and the artist have done, it seems the forger's project may have been, in an important sense, harder. After all, and this is relevant to forgeries regardless of time period, if you're going to produce, say, a Vermeer work, surely it helps to be Vermeer, to have a history of producing that kind of work and to have Vermeer's mind: to have the thought processes, particular talents, intentions and so forth that tend to lead to the production of Vermeers. In trying to produce works that will 'pass' as works of the victim, the forger is clearly disadvantaged by not being the victim (that is, by not sharing the qualities of the victim that lead rather naturally to the production of the right kind of work). If the forger has no compensating bag of tricks derived from historical advantage, her task is obviously quite challenging, and success represents real achievement. The upshot, for our purposes, is that to say the artist has achieved more than the contemporary forger, or done something more difficult in the creation of this particular work, seems implausible. A difference in level of achievement will not serve to distinguish the artist from the forger.
V. Authorship and Innovation
An interesting fact about the kind of forgery I have described is that the forger's project is much more likely to succeed with some types of artists than with others. Probing the reasons for this may lead us to some helpful insights. Prediction, which is our forger's game, is greatly enhanced by reducing the number of variables (such as size, medium and configuration of colours) to be accounted for, and some artists work with many fewer variables than others, as well as restricting the values of the variables. The appropriation artists are an example of this: if one is able to determine which artwork Levine will photograph next, one can make a highly plausible Levine work. The minimalist/conceptualist artist On Kawara, who made a painting of the current date (e.g., Sept. 16, 1987 ) in a uniform format each day over a period of many years, would be another prime victim for the contemporary forger. Such artists work in related series, and elements of the work are repeated throughout the series.
14 This is what makes it plausible that the forger could predict what they will do: predictability requires regularity, operation according to rules, restriction of future possibilities-and greater predictability thus involves the exclusion of more and more possibilities for 13 innovation. So the potential forgeability of these artists' work is another way of describing an absence of innovation, at least within a particular series.
The assumption that continual innovation is necessary for genuine artistic production has led one philosopher to accuse artists who produce multiple works in the same vein of 'self-plagiarism'. 15 And certainly, the seeming lack of innovation in the works of the appropriation artists is one thing that makes their authorship relation to their work appear to be compromised.
Prior to the advent of appropriation art, we might well have been is what we would call the artist's style. Applying this idea to the present discussion, we might say that the artist creates a new rule, or style, whereas the forger's activity simply reapplies an old one: this is one of the obvious answers to the question, 'What makes the artist, and not the forger, an author of her work?' Alfred Lessing's account of forgery runs along these lines. 16 Gombrich advances a related idea:
The history of art … may be described as the forging of master keys for opening the mysterious locks of our senses to which only nature herself originally held the key…. Of course, once the door springs open, once the key is shaped, it is easy to repeat the performance.
The next person needs no special insight-no more, that is, than is needed to copy his predecessor's master key. Walker Evans photographs, there seems to be no warrant for saying that further Evans appropriations are innovative. Unless we want to build in some kind of halo effect or afterglow from the first work produced which would warrant calling the whole series innovative, it seems we must deny that innovation is necessary for artistic authorship (though innovation might still contribute to the value of artworks, as John Hoaglund suggests).
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VI. Artistic Motives
We are in need of another proposal to explain why the artist is an author of her work while the forger fails to be an author. One might be tempted to The problem is that this proposal ignores the realities of artists' decision-making processes. Artists act out of all sorts of motives, some artistic, some not. Sherrie Levine stopped using the photographs of Walker Evans, and started copying photos not protected by copyright within the U.S., after Evans's estate put forward a legal challenge. This circumstance played a strong role in her decision to base some of her works on the photographs of Rodchenko, since Soviet material was not then protected by copyright within the U.S. 21 Andy Warhol is said to have polled his art world associates early in his career to see whether they thought his expressionistic renderings of soup cans would sell better than the colder, slicker versions which emphasized the cans' mass-produced quality. The slicker versions won out, and both Warhol's artistic success and his fame were constructed around them. Warhol was, by his own report, obsessed with achieving fame.
But even if every artistic decision he ever made was driven by this goal, he would still count as an artist. Other artists may be obsessed by jealousy or admiration; and their obsessions may lead them to focus on some other artist with the same intensity our forger displays in focusing on the victim.
But this fact alone does not rule them out of account as artists. We might want to think that some form of authenticity, purity of motive or freedom from instrumental concerns is an ideal for artists; but it would be implausible to claim that lack of authenticity prevents one from being an artist at all.
Authenticity of this sort cannot make for the difference between the forger and the artist in the present discussion.
VII. Artistic Objectives and Responsibility
We have considered and rejected a number of candidates for the relevant difference between artist and forger that accounts for the artist's being considered an author while the forger is not. The artist's level of achievement need not be greater than the forger's, and thus cannot be the source of the artist's authorship. Someone may be the author of an artwork despite failing to produce an innovative product. Artists may be deceptive without failing to be authors, while copyists, whose activity and products are very similar to those of the forger, may fail to be authors despite their honesty; thus deceptiveness is not the dividing line between authors and non-authors. Finally, artists and forgers alike may be driven by non-artistic motives.
However, the last of these proposals requires further consideration.
We entertained and rejected the possibility that the forger fails to count as an author of an artwork because she takes artistic considerations into account only instrumentally, all her activity being driven by a non-artistic motive. Artists may do just the same thing: they may tailor all their artistic activity toward the pursuit of non-artistic goals like fame or revenge against a rival. Thus the nature or content of their ultimate motives and objectives cannot distinguish the artist from the forger.
But perhaps the difference between artist and forger boils down to something simpler. Rather than supposing that the artist has an artistic motive with particular content that accounts for her being an author, we might think the artist need only have a minimal intention that is constitutive of her authorship: namely, the intention to produce artworks. 22 That is, the artist is author of her products by virtue of the intention that they be artworks, whereas the forger fails to be an artist, and thus to be the author of her works, because she possesses no such intention.
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This proposal will need to be elaborated further if it is to have any explanatory power. After all, there is little in the notion of a mere intention to produce artworks that allows us to account for the authorship relation.
Simply to say that artists are the authors of their work because they have an intention to produce artworks, without further detail, would be to propound an empty view, one that does no philosophical work in helping us to understand the nature of authorship. Thus we must ask, what is it in the formulation of such an intention that could transform the situation, so that the artist goes from simply being the maker of a product to being its author?
To find the answer, we may begin by considering the situation of the forger, who is not author of her products. The forger, to count as a forger, cannot but pursue the non-artistic objective of producing an object that will pass as the work of the victim: this objective is constitutive of the role of forger. To the extent that she fails to pursue this objective, she is not a forger. 24 She may be a copyist; she may even be an artist. The point is that the objective is built in to the very concept of forgery, and it determines the The crucial result is that the artist's objectives, originating nowhere else, must originate with her. This isn't to say that these objectives aren't highly subject to influence. Certainly they are, which explains the prevalence of styles and schools, the tendency of artists working within the same milieu to produce related work. But influence, while useful in providing suggestions, can never settle the issue of what the artist should do: she must always decide whether to accept or reject its dictates. The artist, qua artist, has to choose her own objectives; the activity does not choose them 20 for her. The necessity for setting her own objectives provides the artist with a degree of responsibility for her product which the forger lacks, a degree of responsibility worthy of genuine authorship.
The artist's authorship relation to her work, then, does not consist in either her mode of production or the type of product. The artist's authorship is defined by the fact that she bears ultimate responsibility for every aspect of the objectives she pursues through her work, and thus every aspect of the work itself, whether it is innovative in any relevant sense or not. This view is underlined in an interesting way by Elaine Sturtevant's claim that she intentionally included 'errors' in many of her copies of other artists' works.
By including these errors, she reasserts the fact that she bears the final control: her ceding of authority to others is only temporary and contingentor rather, in the final analysis, only apparent. And of course, her responsibility for every aspect of her works would have been present whether she had included these errors or not.
VIII. Appropriation Art and the Reaffirmation of Authorship
This view sheds light on the role of innovation, which has tended to take such precedence in much of recent art history. One way for artists to assert their ultimate responsibility for their production, and therefore their authorship status, clearly is to innovate, to produce distance from what has gone before.
This distance from one's predecessors shows one's refusal to be bound by any existing strictures. Innovation is perhaps the clearest way of demonstrating responsibility for a product. This may be one reason why innovation began to look like an objective that was built in to the very idea of art: to be an artist, one had to attempt to make something new.
On one reading of Sherrie Levine's work, and it's a reading she sometimes encouraged, she aimed to throw off the mantle of innovation, and with it the very mantle of authorship, through her radical appropriation of images created by other artists. 26 She aimed to call into question both their authorship and her own. But given the preceding discussion, we can see that her project, as a project that she chose and intentionally pursued, could what she meant in giving it this or that set of features, for the answer simply grows out of the built-in objectives of her activity of forgery: insofar as she is a forger, she had to give it this or that set of features, since those are the features she judged most likely to be manifested in the victim's next work.
Insofar as she is a forger of the type I have described, she is constrained to pursue a certain kind of project. Attempts to interpret the forger's product, then, will lead us continually back to the same dead end: it has the features it has because of the objective that is constitutive of the forger's role. When we go to interpret the artist's products, on the other hand, our inquiry will never stop short at the mention of some objective the artist was constrained Does this show that there is no real difference between the artist and the forger? Not at all. This artist is a forger insofar as he has adopted the objective of making products that can be passed off as original historical works; but his works are fully interpretable, since it is right to seek from him, qua artist, the reasons for adopting the forger's objective. These reasons must be specific to him: they will never simply reduce to the claim, 'I am an artist, and this is the sort of thing that artists do'.
Of course, if he is a very good (and discreet) artist, we might never society, rather than a constraint that is internal to the very concept of art.
As a result, it is up to the artist to decide whether to acquiesce in this demand or not. 23 Below, I discuss the possible case of a forger who does, in fact, intend his products to be artworks. 24 Failure to satisfy the objective, however, will not rule her out as a forger; bad forgers are still forgers. 25 This is not to say that the forger's objective determines every aspect of her product. Traditional forgers who create pastiches, rather than copies, have considerable leeway in the particular features with which they will imbue their forgeries. Nonetheless, there are parameters within which such forgers must operate, and these parameters place severe restrictions on what they may do. With respect to the forgery of paintings, for example, the relevant parameters will restrict the type of materials, the scale, the colour palette, the subject matter and its treatment, the thickness of paint application and so on. Of course, an artist might accept similar restrictions in order to produce work for a particular patron. The crucial difference is that by violating the restrictions, the artist would not cease to be an artist (though the patron's support might be lost); the forger, though, would cease to be a forger upon wilfully abandoning the parameters that make it possible for the objective of successful forgery to be satisfied. 
